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..het wordt nog mooierEngine of a SmartWings Boeing 737-800 shuts down in-flight,
crew continues to Prague for another 2 hours and 20 minutes on remaining engine
:
...ja ja...Crew didn’t mention to air traffic control that they were flying on one engine
...diverse andere nieuwsbronnen-links via“It was safe to operate,” the airline told Czech newspapers
Heeft niets met ETOPS te maken, geldt voor alle 2 motorige vliegtuigen.Avgeek wrote:Het is ook geen ETOPS kist, dan zou je deze actie nog enigszins goed kunnen praten. Rare manier van handelen van de crew, tenzij de airline ze dit opdroeg te doen.
Kijk nu al uit naar de onderzoeksresultaten en de reden hiervan
...en nog wat:michel N wrote:@B767-300ER:
Marc, an air traffic controller working at the Budapest ACC commented on the article published on The Aviation Herald: “I was in contact with this A/C when they overflew Hungary. Not a word did they mention about engine failure we were informed about a “technical issue”. That is in most cases an air con failure for the 737 to fly at 240 or 250. So they came in at FL240 as they reached the Austrian border we sent them to Vienna Approach.
10 minutes later they called us back to inquire us why we haven’t told them about the engine failure. It turned out that the failure was announced over Prague, Vienna then called us back but we didn’t know either. Serbians were also unaware and I also asked my colleague who was working at KFOR (Kosovo) airspace – it is also operated from Budapest – but he didn’t know either.
...Simon van de Avherald heeft contact gehad met deze Marc.I think that tells a lot about this airline.
And just to add: This evening I had 2 A/C in 20 minutes from this operator on my frequency cruising at 250
so it's not so unusual to see the like that.
Een hardnekkig gerucht gaat dat een "managementpiloot" de captain was.they did declare pan pan though,
I worked app control in Prague that day..
we got the info from prague acc, when the acft was entering our FIR..
we asked repeatedly then, if they need any assistance, or full emg, they said no assistance required, BUT decleared pan pan,
so we had to do the local stby for them..
non of us working app in that time had any idea for how long they were in that one engine flight though..
Lees ook maar de reacties oplast updated Monday, Aug 26th 2019 16:34Z
On Aug 26th 2019 Czechia's Civil Aviation Authority told Czech media that the aircraft did not land at the nearest suitable airport
although required by standard operating procedures and regulations.
Between Samos and Prague there were several suitable airports nearer than Prague.
The CAA pledged: "Therefore, in cooperation with its partners, the Civil Aviation Authority,
across specialized services, collects available information,
evaluates it and takes action after evaluation.
Whether this will result in an administrative proceeding with the commander,
the company, or even the filing of a criminal complaint cannot be predicted at the moment,
CAA will make every effort to prevent a similar scenario from happening again.
In particular, our goal is to rectify the system."
Czechia's UZPLN (Accident Investigation Unit) is also going to investigate the occurrence.
On Aug 26th 2019 The Aviation Herald received information,
that the CVR was already overwritten by the subsequent flights,
the FDR data of the occurrence flight however could be downloaded successfully.
http://avherald.com/h?article=4cbe8434&opt=0last updated Friday, Sep 13th 2019 11:30Z
On Sep 13th 2019 The Aviation Herald learned
that an internal investigation conducted by Smartwings identified there was no systemic fault, but a crew error.
The captain of the flight, at that time head of flight operations of Smartwings,
is no longer head of flight operations,
his deputy has now taken that position.
The captain continues to fly for the airline and maintains privileges as instructor, examiner and TRE.
Czechia's CAA is determined to ensure that such a decision is not taken again in the future and
pledges very harsh penalties.
Surrounding nations also show significant interest in the ongoing investigation,
revocations of overflight permits are being discussed.
last updated Friday, Jul 24th 2020 05:52Z
http://avherald.com/h?article=4cbe8434&opt=0The sequence of events:
- according to the Defect Logbook entry 107847 the fuel pump was running dry before the incident flight
- operation of the fuel pump running dry during the incident flight without fuel as lubricant
- shutdown of the engine and subsequent loss of the propulsion unit
- obvious disregard and violation of applicable Operation Manual Air Traffic Procedures
as well as applicable regulations, provisions and safety recommendations
- defective determination of a suitable aerodrome for safe landing
with a failed engine following fuel pump failure
- poor implementation of fuel policy
- the pilot in command did not follow the principles of Cockpit Resource Management
while performing the QRH's non-normal checklist (NNC) procedures
and thus made it impossible
for the first officer to participate effectively in the decision making process
- failure to complete the relevant NNC QRH procedure point 10 "plan to land at the nearest suitable airport",
the commander avoided the obligation to make a safe landing at the nearest suitable aerodrome
as specified by the aircraft manufacturer's QRH and FCTM valid in commercial air transport
- it can not be satisfactorily demonstrated, but neither reliably ruled out,
that the decisions made by the aircraft commander
and at the same time the flight director of the operator
were influenced by economic aspects.
http://avherald.com/h?article=4cbe8434&opt=0The commander had accumulated 20,900 hours total flight time,
was flight instructor and flight examiner
and was flight director of his operator for more than 15 years.
As such he had great aviation knowledge and experience.
He had approved binding documents like OM, QRH, FCTM, FCOM for his operator.
It is thus difficult to understand that during one flight he ignored, violated and denied the obligations
resulting from the binding OM, QRH, FCTM and FCOM as well as regulations and safety recommendations.
The decision making process by the commander did not proceed according to the defined QRH NNC procedures.
It was not possible to satisfactorily assess the influence of the corporate attitude and management culture
onto the decision making process.
It was also not possible to determine satisfactorily whether and how economic aspects affected the commander's decisions.
